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Abstract. Enunciative praxis was defi ned as comprising all the operations that produce, 
through assuming the system of narrative deep structures, semiotic confi gurations 
suffi  ciently stabilized to be available for other uses. Th e practice of enunciation implies 
an operations chain, organized in collective time, and a capacity for creation and renewal 
in meaning fi gures production, under the constraint of cultural conditions.
Th is conception of enunciation is not an invention of Greimassian semiotics in 
general. It is present already in Saussure, when he describes signs praxis and life of 
languages. Th e founding moment of his reasoning is the substitution of substance by 
action: the sign is not an abstraction obtained by discretization of the substance, the sign 
is a “class of executions”, a praxeological class.
Th e Greimassian enunciative praxis can be defi ned as all acts by which discourses are 
convoked, selected, handled and invented by each particular enunciation. Th is conception 
strengthens the relationship with Saussure’s speaking mass, since the praxis in question 
belongs to no one, and it is not even assignable to a precise linguistic community.
Finally, we may propose to analyse enunciation praxis as a sequence of refl ection 
and exploration, which mediates between primary experience and the semiotic object.
Keywords: enunciation; experience exploration; manifestation; praxis; refl exivity; sign 
duality; sign transmission 
Introduction
Enunciative praxis was defi ned thirty years ago (Greimas, Fontanille 1991: 86–89; 
Bertrand 1993; Fontanille, Zilberberg 1998: 127–150) as comprising all the operations 
that produce, through assuming the system of narrative deep structures, semiotic 
confi gurations suffi  ciently stabilized to be available for other uses, but, for the same 
reason, taken in a constant alteration movement of all semiotic forms. Th e canonical 
narrative schema is one of these forms which we know to be characteristic of European 
cultures; passions and their syntagmatic expansions are other such forms which are also 
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marked by their cultural background. Th e practice of enunciation implies an operations 
chain, organized in collective time, and a capacity for creation and renewal in meaning 
fi gures production, under the constraint of cultural conditions.
So, enunciative praxis has pushed the boundaries of textuality: each particular 
enunciation is put into perspective in the temporal depth of concomitant, anterior, 
and even posterior enunciations. Stereotypes as well as innovations, retrospective as 
well as prospective enunciations, all these movements of enunciative praxis distend the 
textual temporality, and involve it in a temporal pattern that belongs to another plane 
of immanence: that of practices.
But this conception of enunciation is neither an invention of Greimas nor of 
semiotics in general: it is already strongly affi  rmed by Saussure who does not propose a 
theory of enunciation, since according to him praxis belongs to signs and languages life.
Saussure: sign is relentless action and transformation
An active and unstable dual unit
Th e Saussurean sign is dual: a “psychic entity with two faces” that “unites not a thing 
and a name, but a concept and an acoustic image” (CLG 98–99); or it is a “combination 
of two also intangible but absolutely diff erent elements” (CLG 190), a “constant duality”, 
the “junction of two areas”, the “coupling of heterogeneous objects” (ELG, 17–20)1. 
Th is duality is the source of the sign’s instability, because signs are not at all complete 
and forever given, and it is necessary, for any further executions in speech, to assemble 
their two faces into one unit again.
Yet Saussure continues to claim, recurrently and even stubbornly, that this unity 
is indivisible; however, it is indivisible only in thought: we cannot linguistically think 
about the sign otherwise than as a unit. Against this methodological and considered 
interrelatedness, Saussure does not fail to oppose the real instability in the social and 
cultural reality of the same unit of the sign. Th e simple reason is that, in social reality, 
assembling the two faces of the sign is a concrete action to which Saussure refers most 
oft en as an “execution” of the language system, which takes the form of a collective 
process: “Language does not provide a substance in any of its manifestations, but only 
combined or isolated actions of physiological, physical, mental strengths”2 (ELG, 197).
It is a surprising affi  rmation for all those who have read Saussure only through 
Hjelmslev’s prism, or through the structuralist Vulgate: here, there is no substance 
to give a form, but only countless actions. Th e “actions” in question are the result 
1 All translations of citations in this paper are mine, J. F.
2 “Le langage n’off re sous aucune de ses manifestations une substance mais seulement des 
actions combinées ou isolées de forces physiologiques, physiques, mentales.”
56 Jacques Fontanille
of associations between forces and, thus, praxis is the explanation for a dynamic of 
forms. Sign or language, the duality is both formal and inseparable, on the one side 
(the one of thinking of the sign), and active and moving; on the other side (the social 
and concrete one), and this is where its duality is properly “relentless” and opposed to 
any “absolute rest”.
Th e alternative between substance and action disappears in Hjelmslev: behind the 
linguistic form, there is no more than substance, and the action is referred to the 
process. Substance is logically located “before” the form, which is the system (the 
immanence), which then gives rise to the process (the manifestation). Logically, 
Greimas and Courtés recall this in their Dictionary (Greimas, Courtés 1979: 220): 
manifestation presupposes system.
We specifi cally have to examine this relation of the language with the social as well 
as time through praxis. We may be tempted to think that language is involved in the 
social and time, and that, in short, praxis is external (in a social and temporal reality) 
to language itself. But Saussure says otherwise:
[...] Th is is why at any time, contrary to appearances, any semiotic phenomenon 
does not leave outside itself the element of social community: social community 
and its laws are one of its internal and not external elements, that is our point of 
view. (ELG 289–290)3
Language in all its forms is eminently practical, and therefore the social is in the 
language, and not outside.
It is the same with time. Not only has time to do with the execution of the sign: the 
sign as a unit is itself carrying a temporal tension generated by the coexistence within 
it of linearity and instantaneity. Time has not only to do with the formation of the sign 
as a bifacial unit, it is never out of the sign.
Praxis transmission
Still, language and signs, even in case of this constant praxis, appear both relatively 
stable, yet caught in an uncontrollable change. Stability is the work of the linguistic 
convention: once forms are constituted, praxis stabilizes them thanks to convention. 
But why, once the convention is established, does it not keep up imperturbably? If the 
answer to this question is essentially based on the principle of arbitrariness, it mobilizes 
also all the problems of transmission.
3 “C’est pourquoi à aucun moment, contrairement à l’apparence, le phénomène sémiologique 
quel qu’il soit ne laisse hors de lui-même l’élément de la collectivité sociale: la collectivité sociale et 
ses lois est un de ses éléments internes et non externes, tel est notre point de vue.”
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Although it is present in the CLG, transmission has not the same status as in 
Saussure’s writings. It is in the ELG that we can see that if social convention can be 
considered as a factor of conservation, stability and resistance to innovation, it also 
supports the sign’s alteration, due to the displacement of the relationship between 
the signifi er and the signifi ed: this paradox can be resolved if we consider signs’ and 
languages’ circulation and transmission in time.
And again, far from being an external property, transmission is a praxis which is 
inherent to the constitution of the sign; it is neither a movement caused by an external 
force nor an independent structural property, but an ongoing process located in the 
sign and with respect to its dual constitution. 
Th is will be the capital reaction of the study of language in the theory of signs, 
this will be the forever new horizon it opens [...], that has taught and revealed 
to it a whole new side of the sign, namely that it begins to be truly known only 
when we see that it is not only a transmissible thing, but of his nature to be 
transmitted, alterable. But for those who want to make the theory of language, it 
is the hundredfold complication. (ELG, 220)4
Th e transmission in question is very specifi c, as it relates to relationships, negations 
and diff erences. In this, the transmission is inextricably linked to the conventional 
character of the sign, and endows it with a perpetual “second life”:
What is special about the conventional sign is that the disciplines that might have 
to deal with it have not suspected that this sign was transmissible, and thus has a 
second life, about which we can say that these disciplines (as well as the public in 
general) have no kind of notion. (ELG, 229).5
Th e identity of the sign is nothing but social agglomeration of its performances: a 
diff erential, social, praxeological, plural and interactive identity. Th e sign is neither a 
naturally given entity nor created to be recovered and spread (or degraded). It is a unit 
that continues only because of the diversity of the acts that constitute it, producing 
4 “Ce sera la réaction capitale de l’étude du langage sur la théorie des signes, ce sera l’horizon à 
jamais nouveau qu’elle aura ouvert [...], que de lui avoir appris et révélé tout un côté nouveau du 
signe, à savoir que celui-ci ne commence à être réellement connu que quand on a vu qu’il est une 
chose non seulement transmissible, mais 1° de sa nature destiné à être transmis, 2° modifi able. 
Seulement pour celui qui veut faire la théorie du langage, c’est la complication centuplée.” 
5 “Ce qu’il y a de particulier dans le signe conventionnel, c’est que les disciplines qui pouvaient 
avoir à s’en occuper ne se sont pas doutées que ce signe était transmissible, et par là doté d’une 
seconde vie, dont on peut bien dire que ces disciplines (de même que le public en général) n’ont 
aucune espèce de notion.”
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variants series which are the only mode of existence where we can observe and grasp 
it, through its multiple executions.
Th e founding moment of this reasoning is the substitution of substance by action: 
the sign is not an abstraction obtained by discretization of the substance, the sign is a 
“class of executions”, a praxeological class. And like any practice, that “praxis course” 
has neither relevant origin nor end: in theory, we can stop it, but by nature, and by 
defi nition, it can only “continue”. We can see the point of divergence between what 
became structural linguistics (especially via Hjelmslev), refl ecting the transition from 
substance to form, then from immanent form to manifestation, and what it might 
have become if it had taken into account the other version, the one of practical action 
within the sign and the system.
Th e result, according to Saussure himself, is that “the original contract is confused 
with what happens in the language every day”, which means that the origin of the 
“original contract” dissolves in all the moments in course of the long practice. It is 
precisely this fundamental aspect that is concerned with the transmission of the sign: in 
addition to its social quality, the convention that constitutes it, far from being reifying 
and congealing, it is a kind of “social permanency in circulation” under which signs are 
indefi nitely reconstructed and experienced as identical because they appear congruent 
with or diff erent from other ones.
In this perspective, convention and sign circulation do not succeed, they overlap, 
and in this transmission is suspended and invalidates the distinction between, on 
the one hand, the dual structure of the sign, and on the other hand, communication: 
signs only emerge and are realized in interaction. Th erefore, transmission is not an 
event which would be external to signs, or an accessory or added attribute: it is the 
result of “signs’ life in social life”, for which circulation, recovery and dissemination are 
inseparable from the dual constitution, once it is accepted that this dual constitution 
implies a practical dynamic. Th is is also related to the fact that the sign has some reality 
and is transmitted only as value, and the value cannot be conceived independently of 
exchange, interaction and time.
It is also in its transmission that the sign is realized as a unit still undergoing 
change, and as a factor in redistributing the values of other signs. And it is in its nature, 
Saussure writes, to be “destined to transmission”, that is to say, made for transmission 
and transmitted to be made:
[...] See immediately the entire insignifi cance of a point of view starting from the 
relationship of an idea and a sign out of time, out of the transmission, which alone 
teaches us (experimentally) that what is the sign. (ELG, 231)6
6 “Constatons tout de suite l’entière insignifi ance d’un point de vue qui part de la relation d’une idée 
et d’un signe hors du temps, hors de la transmission, qui seule nous enseigne (expérimentalement) ce 
que vaut le signe.” 
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In brief: instability and displacement of value, sociality and temporality of exchange.
Th e property of the sign to merge in it instability, temporality and alterity, as an 
internal and active base of its own alteration makes the process of transmission analysable 
both in the synchronic and the diachronic perspectives. Th e well-known interest of 
Saussure in the issue of time is therefore not just about its historical dimension. More 
specifi cally, the issue of transmission shows that Saussure’s synchrony is not out of time, 
contrary to what the structuralist Vulgate would try to convince us in.
Synchrony is a methodological point of view on language; it is also a transposition of 
the feeling, but only a feeling, about the system’s stability that speaking subjects have at 
some point, allowing them to believe that mutual understanding is possible. Diachrony 
is another point of view on language and signs, but a point of view that does not have 
the time privilege. So, if there is, according to Saussure, a very permanent feature 
of language facts, it is that of the process of their interactive and temporalized (re)
structuring: we may seize it in synchrony to build relationships, classes and paradigms 
from the series of practical executions, and we may also seize it in diachrony to build 
transformations and reconfi gurations rules. Yet in both cases, the object is the same, 
and only the point of view is changing.
We have to insist that the conception of the transmission practice is incompatible 
with the one of the sign as a communication tool, because it makes change and praxis-
internal operations in the system, and is not a phenomenon that could be applied from 
the outside: successive transmissions inevitably produce movements in the relationship 
between the signifi er and the signifi ed, movements which have no external basis and 
which are, in themselves, ultimately a perpetual (re)establishment of the convention:
But we did not say, as I recognize, why they [the signs] shall be altered. And it is 
easy for me to indicate the reason for this abstaining. Early on, I indicated that 
there were distinct alteration factors, but ones so mixed in their eff ect that it is not 
wise to try at once separate them. I said that the ‘total fact’ could only and surely 
be translated by the phrase ‘moving of the total relationship’ between signifi er and 
signifi ed, the alteration would be either in the signifi er, or in the signifi ed. So we 
take alteration without separating its causes or its forms, because there is some 
danger in wanting to do so without further precaution. (ELG, 329–330)7
7 “Mais nous n’avons pas dit, je le reconnais, pourquoi ils [les signes] doivent s’altérer. Et il m’est 
facile d’indiquer la raison de cette abstention. Dès l’abord, j’ai indiqué qu’il y avait des facteurs 
d’altération distincts, mais tellement mélangés dans leur eff et qu’il n’est pas prudent de vouloir 
à l’instant même les séparer. J’ai dit que le fait total ne pouvait se traduire avec sûreté que par le 
mot de déplacement du rapport total entre signifi ant et signifi é, soit que l’altération soit dans le 
signifi ant, soit qu’elle soit dans le signifi é. Donc nous prenons l’altération sans séparer ses causes ni 
ses formes, parce qu’il y a quelque danger à vouloir le faire sans autre forme de procès.”
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For Saussure, the sign is therefore a dynamic entity, “alive”, so refractory to immobility 
or closing, which forbids giving a positive view of its unit. Th e sign itself is ceaseless 
activity, a still tensive entity, based on a set of non-concordances: arbitrary relationship 
between concepts and acoustic images; no-coincidence between this fi rst duality and the 
duality signifi ed/signifi er; a temporal tension between the signifi er, the signifi ed, and 
sign; plurality and diversity of executions within its identity. Th e sign is, by defi nition 
and constitution, dependent on these non-concordances and it continues them during 
its transmission and transformation in time.
Th e dynamics of the sign is neither a refl ection of a diff erent external dynamic, nor 
determined by it, but it involves constant interaction between semiotic, psychological 
and social systems.
Th ere is no example of absolute immobility. What is absolute is the principle of 
language movement in time. A movement which is done in various ways and, 
depending on the case, more or less rapidly, but fatally. (ELG, 311)
[...] a socio-historical phenomenon which causes the vortex of signs in the 
vertical column and then precludes making it neither a fi xed phenomenon nor 
a conventional language, since it is the incessant result of social action, imposed 
beyond any choice.8 (ELG, 102)
Greimas and enunciation in act: 
Manifestation, semiosis, praxis
Generation and manifestation
With Hjelmslev being inserted between Saussure and Greimas, we may expect some 
purifi cation of the practical dimension. And indeed, following Greimas, semiotic 
practice (generally defi ned as operations that produce semiosis) remained long 
(maybe always) more or less distinct from the enunciation issue. For the latter, without 
expanding on an already known position, just remember that enunciation is mainly 
described as a “creative schizie” (Greimas, Courtés 1979: 79; entry ‘Disengagement’), 
the shift ing out that projects in discourse the categories of person, time and space 
from deictic elements characteristic of enunciation. Th is is not a praxis, but only a 
8 “Il n’y a pas d’exemple d’immobilité absolue. Ce qui est absolu, c’est le principe du mouvement 
de la langue dans le temps. Mouvement qui se fait de façon diverse et plus ou moins rapide selon 
les cas, mais fatalement.” 
“[...] phénomène socio-historique qui entraîne le tourbillon des signes dans la colonne 
verticale et défend alors d’en faire ni un phénomène fi xe ni un langage conventionnel, puisqu’il 
est le résultat incessant de l’action sociale, imposé hors de tout choix.” 
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single formal operation, a split in isotopy within categories defi ning this instance of 
enunciation.
As for the former issue, the practice of semiosis production, Greimas’ theory is 
a little more explicit, especially about ‘manifestation’, this concept of Greimas being 
closest to those we may mobilize to describe semiosis. Th e manifestation is due to 
an interruption of the generative path. Let us examine more specifi cally the entry 
‘Manifestation’ in Greimas and Courtés Dictionary:
Th e diff erent levels of depth that can be distinguished are the articulations of 
the immanent structure of each of the two planes of language (expression and 
content), taken separately, and mark out their generative path; the manifestation 
is, however, an incidence, an interruption and a deviation, which requires any 
instance of this path to build up as a plane of signs. [...] In analysing the deep 
structures and wanting to take account of them by any system of representation, 
the linguist stops, fi xates, at one point, the generative path, and then manifests 
the monoplane immanent structures, using a series of biplane signs (or of 
interpretable symbols). Similarly, the distinction between the abstract and the 
fi gurative discourses can be established, given the interruption of generative 
path, followed by manifestation, at two diff erent times of the production process. 
(Greimas, Courtés 1979: 220)9
Th is is not an aleatory incident that would aff ect the generative path of content or 
expression, but the very principle of manifestation, which always aff ects the two 
planes: the interruption of the generative process. Th is interruption does not belong to 
immanence and system: it would even be an absurd assumption, since for Greimas, 
the “system” refers to virtual deep structures, and these structures are themselves an 
important part of the generative path. So it is not clear at all, in Greimas’ theory, how 
the interruption of the generative path could be part of the generative path itself. We 
do not fi nd in Greimas any solution as strongly integrated as in Saussure: neither praxis 
nor time of praxis and social seems to belong to the immanent system.
9 “Les diff érents niveaux de profondeur que l’on peut distinguer sont des articulations 
de la structure immanente de chacun des deux plans du langage (expression et contenu) 
pris séparément, et jalonnent leur parcours génératif ; la manifestation est, au contraire, une 
incidence, une interruption et une déviation, qui oblige une instance quelconque de ce parcours à 
se constituer en un plan des signes. [...] Lorsqu’il analyse les structures profondes et veut en rendre 
compte à l’aide d’un système de représentation quelconque, le linguiste arrête, fi xe, à un moment 
donné, le parcours génératif, et manifeste alors les structures immanentes monoplanes à l’aide d’un 
enchaînement de signes biplanes (ou de symboles interprétables). De même, la distinction entre le 
discours abstrait et le discours fi guratif peut être établie, compte tenu de l’interruption, suivie de 
manifestation, du parcours génératif à deux moments distincts du processus de production.”
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Th e status of that operation, the interruption of the generative path, is not specifi ed 
here, and will be so only in an incidental and marginal note to the entry ‘Enunciation’ 
in the Dictionary:
Finally, we must add one last point regarding downstream enunciation: as an act, 
it has the eff ect of producing semiosis or, to be more precise, this continuous set of 
semiotic acts called manifestation. Th e signifying act meets here the constraints 
of the expression substance, making it obligatory to implement textualization 
procedures.10 (Greimas, Courtés 1979: 127)
Th e theoretical combination is very explicit, but has been little noticed and still less 
exploited by Greimas’ successors: (1) the act of enunciation (creative schizie) that leads 
to manifestation; (2) the semiosis, aft er manifestation; (3) the specifi cation of semiosis 
toward expression through the textualization process.
Regarding manifestation, we can also note that it can be operated by the analyst 
himself, who also may interrupt the generative path to feed his analysis with categories 
he may extract and textualize in his discourse of analysis. In this case, the operation 
of the generation interruption is part of a voluntary act. But we can also observe in 
Greimas’ and Courtés’ presentation that producing a description discourse (by the 
analyst) does not proceed diff erently from any other (e.g., fi gurative) kind of discourse. 
What the analyst does, such as textualizing directly actantial structures, or the narrative 
programs, bypassing their fi gurative presentation (actors, times, spaces), any other 
enunciation can do it as well, with other substances and forms of expression.
Th e interruption of the generation in preparation for manifestation is therefore 
the act by which the production of all discourses is possible. Th is interruption is one 
of the actions that are imputable to the analyst, or to another enunciation actor, and 
other instances, involuntary and not conscious, may also operate. As concerns the two 
planes of language, expression and content, we have to suppose two concomitant (or 
not concomitant) interruptions, in the same (or diff erent) generative phase, about the 
two generative paths. Th e only mention of any coordination between two interruption 
operations, on the two planes of language, which is not explicitly envisaged by Greimas, 
yet would open a direct dialogue with Saussure’s conception, is that we have just 
described, and on the expected complexity of a praxis.
Greimas’ and Courtés’ reasoning here is still typically the same as that of Saussure: 
the expression plane and the content plane may be analysed separately, as is the case for 
the abstract and formal signifi ers and signifi ed in Saussure, but they reach manifestation 
10 “Il faut enfi n ajouter une dernière remarque concernant l’aval de l’énonciation : en tant 
qu’acte, celle-ci a pour eff et de produire la semiosis ou, pour être plus précis, cette suite continue 
d’actes sémiotiques qu’on appelle la manifestation. L’acte de signifi er retrouve ici les contraintes de 
la substance de l’expression, obligeant à mettre en place des procédures de textualisation.”
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only thanks to the assembly of the two planes of language, thanks to semiosis that gives 
them a new mode of existence, “on the plane of signs”. Th is new mode of existence is the 
realized mode, just as, in Saussure, the ‘reality’ of signs constituted by the assembly of 
the signifi er and the signifi ed. Both studied and separately taken planes are immanent, 
and once assembled, semiosis “realizes” them.
Manifestation is not only an incidental interruption of immanent generation, it also 
involves a realizing semiosis. An interruption and then a realization of semiosis: the 
manifestation is doubly an output from immanence. Th e question that keeps surfacing 
concerns the status of this “reality”: is it internal to language?
Enunciative praxis
Th ere is another proximity with Saussure: as in the latter, the collective and massive 
“eff ectuations” of the immanent system (i.e., for semiotics: the deep narrative 
structures), and the constituting operations of semiosis (the assembly of the signifi er 
and the signifi ed in Saussure, and those of the expression and the content planes in 
Greimas), constantly move the two planes relative to each other: the possibilities of 
generative process interruptions leading to semiosis are then only a part of a larger set 
of operations, to be named “enunciative praxis”11 later12. We may now measure the 
whole extent of this potential set of operations:
(1) at each level of the generative path, an interruption is possible;
(2) the number of levels where interruptions are possible is not permanently fi xed;
(3) the model predicts possible distortions between what comes from the generative 
path (immanent being) and what is actually expressed (manifested appearance);
(4) nothing in the structures of both generative paths (expression and content) 
neither motivates, nor compels, nor prefi gures, before their assembling and 
realizing in semiosis, the nature and properties of what will be assembled.13
Now, we can make the assumption that praxis, following Greimas, originates in this 
double generation interruption: if we assume that the immanent structures are stable, 
if not permanent, these interruptions, leading to manifestation and semiosis, are at 
the origin of the formation of more or less complex confi gurations, which in turn 
11 We fi nd a fi rst mention, and in Greimas, Fontanille 1991: 86–89.
12 Signifi cantly, in the fi rst volume of Sémiotique: Dictionnaire de la théorie du langage (1979), 
there are no entries ‘praxis’ or ‘enunciative praxis’. It appears only in the second volume (Paris, 
Hachette 1986), always under the direction of Greimas and Courtés, but in a collective writing.
13 Th e only constraint in this case is that the two planes must be both ‘isomorphic’ (they must 
have compatible and joinable forms) and ‘allotopic’ (they must use diff erent isotopies).
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are stabilized. Th is stabilization does not occur in the virtual deep structures system, 
but in a kind of cultural “encyclopedia”, where these semiotic confi gurations remain 
available to other enunciations, and/or may facilitate the automation of subsequent 
generative interruption operations. Greimas does not include Umberto Eco’s concept 
of ‘encyclopedia’, but he must nevertheless imagine a specifi c space, belonging to the 
semiotic universe, yet not merging with the systemic virtualities: this space, in which 
cultural consistencies and distinctions are all made and unmade, is that of semiotic 
“primitives” (Greimas, Fontanille 1991: 86–89).
Enunciative praxis can be defi ned as all acts by which discourses are convoked, 
selected, handled and invented by each particular enunciation, and, it should be added, 
from the point of view of the community that assumes and integrates these individual 
productions. For, indeed, enunciative praxis is also characterized, above all, by its 
contribution to the infl ections and reconfi gurations of cultural primitives. In Semiotics 
of Passions Greimas and Fontanille (1991: 88) specify in particular:
Enunciative praxis is this return that, between the discursive level and other 
levels, makes it possible to constitute cultures semiotically. [...] Th e ‘primitives’ 
thus obtained appear as taxonomies that, under the confi gurations convoked in 
discourses, function there in a way as connotations, distinct from denotations 
resulting from convoking of the universals. In this sense, the enunciative praxis 
conciliates a generative path and a genetic process, and associates in discourse the 
products of a timeless articulation of meaning and those of history.14
Finally, we can notice that in Greimas, this draft  praxis is explicitly attributed to an 
enunciation actor only in the case of the production of description discourse and meta-
linguistic semiosis, and in other cases, praxis seems to operate by itself. However, if 
there are one or more operations, there is necessarily an instance operator, that is to 
say an actant, but it remains a potential actant. Th en we can speak of the “impersonal” 
of enunciation, but this “impersonal” seems to have its origin in the impossibility of 
imputing the generative interruption and the manifestation to anyone.
Th e subsequent emergence of the concept of enunciative praxis strengthens the 
relationship with Saussure’s ‘speaking mass’, since the praxis in question belongs to no 
one, and, as regards the general discourses, and even beyond all the possible semiotic 
14 “La praxis énonciative est cet aller-retour qui, entre le niveau discursif et les autres niveaux, 
permet de constituer sémiotiquement des cultures. [...] les ‘primitifs’ ainsi obtenus se présentent 
comme des taxinomies qui, sous-jacentes aux confi gurations convoquées dans les discours, y 
fonctionnent en quelque sorte comme des connotations, distinctes des dénotations qui résultent de 
la convocation des universaux. En ce sens, la praxis énonciative concilie un parcours génératif et 
un processus génétique et associe dans le discours les produits d’une articulation atemporelle de la 
signifi cation et ceux de l’histoire.”
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objects, it is not even assignable to a linguistic community. At most we may assume 
today that forms of living and semiotic forms of social existence and, more broadly, 
semiospheres, could provide some frameworks to identify what, from the point of view 
of general semiotics, would play the same role as of Saussure’s speaking mass.
Outlook: enunciation as a practice sequence
A fi eld maneuvres
Today, any particular enunciation is supposed to participate in a wider fi eld of 
enunciation maneuvers, more general and collective. In this respect, it is immediately 
considered at least as “re-enunciation” of prior or contemporaneous enunciations. To 
move forward on this issue, we might now specify what is a practical enunciation, 
or rather, a practice of enunciation. Indeed, since enunciation is considered as re-
enunciation, and even more so if it is treated as “polyphonic”, it cannot be limited to 
the “act of language individual appropriation” even if this act becomes more complex 
as a double interruption of the generative path of expression and content. Individual 
enunciation is only a local phase in a global and collective process, and it always 
results in confi rmation or denial, adjustment or turning, assumption or rejection of 
an encyclopedia of semiotic primitives that has no individual nature.
Th erefore, enunciation should be examined on another plane of immanence than 
textuality. In a strictly textual conception, enunciation is just the act of individual 
language appropriation, in that it produces a particular text from the linguistic and 
semiotic systems. But we cannot base a collective, polyphonic, multidimensional and 
evolving enunciation on the only plane of immanence of textuality: it is necessarily 
procedural and practical, and that is why Greimas chose the name ‘enunciative praxis’.
At this stage of refl ection, we have the following elements:
(1) any enunciation presupposes, explores and manifests one or several previous, 
subsequent or concomitant experiences;
(2) these experiences may be somatic, textual practices, or other ones: media, 
scientifi c, etc.;
(3) therefore they may have been explicitly taken over by other enunciations whose 
acts and authors are identifi able (in which case there is, strictly speaking, enunciation 
and re-enunciation), but they may also be only stored, shared or transmitted within 
an individual or collective experience, without previous identifi able enunciation; in 
all cases, these experiences have resulted in textual, practical or existential semiosis;
(4) the experience in question is accessible to a refl exive exploration, and malleable 
enough to be transposed into another semiosis.
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All of these conditions constitute enunciation as a specifi c practice, a practice of 
semiosis production from experience. We may then try to provide a canonical sequence 
of enunciation practice.
The enunciative practice sequence
In his latest book about modes of existence, Bruno Latour (2012) proposes to consider 
that meaning happens in the world of existence thanks to instauration, an operation 
which is minimally defi ned by intensifi cation and extension of presence, without 
having to suppose fi rst any subject actant to which we would impute an enunciation. 
Instauration is only attributable to a dynamic state of things, a diff use and emerging 
instance.
Practices specifi cally happen to meaning because they pursue their course despite 
obstacles and resistance (extensively) and because they can only do that owing to an 
engagement force that maintains this practical course (intensively). And again, this 
extensive and intensive instauration may only be attributed to a diff use, multifaceted, 
and moving instance. Th erefore, instauration is the primary and elementary form of 
practical enunciation. Th ere is enunciation because the meaning emerges from the 
dynamics of a course of action, and from the activity of an instance which is itself 
becoming instaured.
Something is instaured, but from what? By transformation or conversion of what 
else? If the instauration is not a magical operation that arouses the meaning ex nihilo, 
it is supposed to transform something the meaning of which is not yet accessible, 
into another thing that is a meaningful whole. What, then, would the signifi cant and 
instaured manifestation be the transformation of? Our answer is: it is the transformation 
of experience. Human experience in search of its meaning becomes a semiotic practice, 
since it is itself accessible to experience: this elementary refl exivity is the starting point 
and the minimum requirement for meaning questioning. It is precisely in this refl exive 
experience that intensity and extension are perceived and understood, both being 
necessary in order that there would be “instauration”.
Th e enunciation-instauration of practical meaning transforms experience into 
meaningful manifestation: what remains to be done now is to describe this enunciative 
mediation. It should be noted immediately that the practice of enunciation cannot be 
a social or individual practice like any other: not only does it produce meaning, which 
is not the case of other practices, but also it enunciates it, and it produces a semiosis 
in its proper form.
Th e fi rst experience articulation will be a refl ection, in this specifi c enunciation-
instauration, practising gives the feeling of practising. On either side of the predicate 
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“gives the feeling”, the fi rst “practising” is aff ecting, and the second is aff ected. Th e 
elementary refl ection in the course of practice is an aff ect. In other words, this 
elementary refl exive aff ect emerges in two simultaneous or successive phases: practising, 
and feeling practising. Something takes form in action, and the aff ect refl exively retakes 
it. At the heart of the experience we can thus see the two “taking” and “retaking”. From 
this point of view, any enunciative practice has, as we have seen, a capacity of stabilizing 
or destabilizing forms, or, in short, some procedures to ensure the recognition of 
phases and moments of practical courses. Refl ection forms and deforms patterns and 
models. Taking and retaking forms are the two basic moments of the refl ective phase 
of enunciation considered as practice.
Th e second articulation is the answer to the fi rst aff ect: the refl exive aff ect is a 
request for meaning, which is answered by an exploration of this aff ect, which results 
in a semiosis, producing a semiotic object. Th is semiosis may adopt a wide variety 
of expression planes, alternatively or successively: enunciative exploration is then 
completed with one or more transpositions in diff erent expressions; e.g. the experience 
can be for olfactory, or emotional, and its exploration can lead to textual or visual 
semiosis.
Exploration schematizes and transposes experience. To do this, it must fi rst, and 
simultaneously, extract and explore the properties of this experience and convert them 
into proper internal dependencies in a semiotic object. Moreover, it intensifi es, expands 
and specifi es the practical aff ect: it asks the experience feeling to extract patterns and 
properties from it, to elicit some answers and to utilize those answers by transposing 
them from one substance of expression to another.
Th is process is particularly evident, for example, when it comes to visualizing 
“invisible” properties of a body or any physical system: scientifi c imaging demonstrates 
in this respect a remarkable technical inventiveness to respond to all cases of invisibility 
and inaccessibility: interactions between materials and energy arouse the physical 
system to get answers (signals of various technical types), which are themselves subject 
to substantial transpositions, that makes them access to visual semiosis. Th e products 
of these sophisticated explorations are supported by schematization, spatialization, and 
temporalization, up to the fi nal visualization.
Th e exploration of the experience by enunciation practice includes at least:
(1) interaction and excitation of the objects of experience, so as to extract 
exploitable properties (information, signals, sensitive or physical qualities);
(2) transposition of these properties and products of the primary interaction-
excitation in the corresponding properties of a semiotic fi eld (computer 
transduction, projection on a support, plastic organization, etc.);
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(3) semiotic manifestation (assembling contents and expressions), which results 
in the production of a semiotic object on its own support and following its 
own organization and interpretation rules.
Th us the double sequence of refl ection and exploration mediates between primary 
experience and semiotic object.
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Практика и высказывание: Греймас как наследник Соссюра
Практика высказывания определяется как совокупность всех операций, которые, 
основываясь на системе нарративных глубинных структур, производят достаточно 
стабильные семиотические конфигурации, пригодные для использования. Практика 
высказывания подразумевает коллективную, организованную в коллективном времени 
операционную цепь, а также способность к созданию и возобновлению фигур значения 
с учетом прилагаемых культурой ограничений. 
Такая концепция высказывания не является изобретением Греймаса. Она появляется 
уже у Соссюра, когда он описывает практику знаков и жизнь языков. Основополагающим 
моментом его рассуждений является замена субстанции действием: знак не является 
дистиллированной из субстанции абстракцией; знак – это «класс действий», практика.
Греймасовскую практику высказывания можно определить как совокупность 
действий, посредством которых каждое конкретное высказывание собирает, отбирает, 
обрабатывает и изобретает дискурсы. Эта концепция усиливает связь с «говорящей 
массой» Соссюра, так как рассматриваемая практика никому не принадлежит и ее нельзя 
приписывать к конкретному лингвистическому сообществу.
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В конце статьи автор предлагает проанализировать практику высказывания как 
последовательность рефлексии и исследования, которая выступает посредником между 
первичным опытом и семиотическим объектом.
Praksis ja enontsiatsioon: Saussure’i pärija Greimas
Enontsiatiivset praktikat on defi neeritud koosnevana kõigist operatsioonidest, mis narratiivsete 
süvastruktuuride süsteemist lähtuvalt loovad piisavalt stabiilseid semiootilisi konfi guratsioone. 
Enontsiatsioonipraktika osutab kollektiivses ajas organiseeritud operatsiooniahelale ning loomis- 
ja uuenemisvõimele tähendusfi guuride tekitamisel kultuuripiiranguid arvestades.
Sellist enontsiatsioonikontseptsiooni ei leiutatud otseselt Greimase semiootikas. See esineb 
juba Saussure’il, kus see kirjeldab märgipraksist ja keelte elu. Tema arutelu algtõukeks on 
substantsi asendamine tegevusega: märk ei ole substantsist eristatud abstraktsioon, märk on 
“soorituste klass”, prakseoloogiline klass.
Greimaslikku enontsiatiivset praktikat saab defi neerida kui kõiki tegusid, mille kaudu iga 
konkreetne enontsiatsioon diskursusi koondab, valib, käsitleb ja loob. See kontseptsioon tugevdab 
seost Saussure’i ‘kõneleva massiga’, sest kõnealune praksis ei kuulu kellelegi ja seda ei saa isegi 
omistada mingile konkreetsele keelekogukonnale.
Teeme ettepaneku analüüsida enontsiatsioonipraktikat refl eksiooni ja uurimise jadana, mis 
vahendab primaarset kogemust ja semiootilist objekti. 
